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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 1990, President Bush signed into law the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (hereinafter the "ADA").1 In what has been hailed as the most sweeping
civil rights legislation in over twenty-five years, the ADA prohibits discrimination
based on an individual's handicap in all phases of employment and requires rea-
sonable accommodation by employers for such persons.2 In addition to the
changes in employment law, the ADA also prohibits discrimination in public ser-
vices,' public accommodation4 and telecommunications.'
In 1989, the United States Congress found that some forty-three million Amer-
icans are either physically or mentally disabled.' In addition, Congress' investiga-
tions into the plight of the handicapped revealed that disabled Americans rank at
* Mr. Gerson is a partner with the law firm of McDonnell Boyd in Memphis, Tennessee, and heads the Firm's
employment law department.
** Mr. Addison is an associate with McDonnell Boyd and is a member of the Firm's employment law depart-
ment.
1. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990)) (hereinafter ADA).
2. ADA §§ 101-108 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, 12111 note (1990)).
3. ADA §§ 201-246 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, 12161 note (1990)).
4. ADA §§ 301-3 10 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189, 12181 note (1990)).
5. ADA §§ 401-402 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 152,221,225, 611 (1990)).
6. ADA § 2(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1990)).
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or near the top in unemployment and poverty rates.' Indeed, statistics presented
before Congress show that nearly 65 % of the non-institutionalized disabled people
between the working ages of sixteen to sixty-five years of age are unemployed. 8
In the past there has only been limited protection for handicapped individuals
with respect to employment discrimination. Federal protection was afforded to
employees of the federal government and to employees of government contractors
and sub-contractors. 9
Some states have also passed varying levels of restrictions.10 However, until the
passage of the ADA, there has been no national procedure for protecting all pri-
vate sector employees from discrimination based upon physical or mental disabili-
ties.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act which specifically deal with employment law. The analysis will
include a review of past federal and state laws covering handicapped discrimina-
tion, as well as an explanation of the passage and effect of the Act.
II. HISTORY OF HANDICAPPED DISCRIMINATION LAW
A. Federal Law
Although no comprehensive protection for handicapped workers existed until
passage of the ADA, Congress made several attempts in the past to provide protec-
tion to disabled Americans. For example, during the 1970's, several bills were in-
troduced which attempted to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include
mentally or physically handicapped individuals as a protected group." These at-
tempts to amend the anti-discrimination laws governing private employees were
unsuccessful.
On the other hand, not all Congressional attempts to prohibit discrimination of
the handicapped were unsuccessful. Beginning in the late 1960's, Congress passed
numerous statutes designed to prohibit various types of discrimination such as the
removal of architectural barriers in federal buildings;12 the removal of barriers to
handicapped children in the public education system;13 required access to public
7. Kennedy Vows Quick Action on Legislation to Bar Private Discrimination Against Disabled, 188 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) A-8 (Sept. 28, 1988)(discussing the testimony of Sandra Swift Parrine, Chairman of the National
Council on the Handicapped) [hereinafter Quick Action].
8. Id.
9. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988).
10. See State Fair Employment Practice Laws, Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) 451:101-206 (Jan. 1989) (contains a
listing and synopsis of state laws concerning the regulation of discrimination of the handicapped); see also infra
notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
11. For example, in 1971, there was an attempt to amend Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit
discrimination against those with a "physical or mental handicap." See H.R. 12154, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117
CONG. REc. 45945 (1971); S. 3044, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. Rc. 525 (1972). These attempts failed.
In addition, there was also an effort to amend Title VII to prohibit handicap discrimination. See H.R. 14033,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 9712 (1972). This attempt also failed.
12. The Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (1988).
13. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988).
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airlines;14 and the removal of barriers to voting."5 However, these legislative ini-
tiatives were often limited to federal programs or recipients of federal aid and of-
fered little or no shelter from discrimination in the context of employment.
The federal government made its first major foray into the area of employment
discrimination against the handicapped when it enacted the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.16 This legislation was designed to provide vocational rehabilitation and em-
ployment opportunities for the disabled. 17 The Rehabilitation Act went about
achieving these goals in several different ways.
First, Section 50118 attempted to make the federal government a model equal
opportunity employer by requiring every federal department and agency to imple-
ment an affirmative action plan to hire and promote disabled individuals.19 Next,
Section 50320 places a similar objective and affirmative action obligation on con-
tractors with contracts of $2,500 or more with the federal government.21
Undoubtedly, the federal government's most far reaching impact on employ-
ment discrimination in the private sector came from Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act. 22 Section 504 prohibits all discrimination, including employment,
against qualified handicapped individuals in any program or activity receiving fi-
nancial assistance from the federal government. 23 Although the section reached
out beyond employees of the federal government, even these prohibitions are lim-
ited to those actually receiving money from the federal government.24
Aside from this limited extension of protections, Section 504 is important for
another reason as well: it provides a statutory model for the ADA.25 Therefore, a
cursory review of the provisions of Section 504 is warranted.
For purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, a handicapped individual is defined as a
person "who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such impairment,
or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.
2
14. Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c) (1988).
15. Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee (1982).
16. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982) [hereinafter Rehabilitation Act].
17. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
18.29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988).
19. Id. See also EEOC Management Directive 711, Nov. 2, 1982.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1988).
21. Id.
22.29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
23. Id.
24. Id. See Handicapped Discrimination, Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) 421:651 (Mar. 1984).
25. The drafters and supporters of the ADA have expressed this fact in scores of settings in an attempt to as-
sure critics that the ADA will be implemented with a finite set of case law to aid in construction of the Act. For
example, while testifying before a House Judiciary Subcommittee, U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh
explained that the existing case law defining the terms and conditions of Section 504 would provide assistance in
defining the terms of the ADA. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Const. Rights of the House Judi-
ciary Committee at 192-232. In addition, comparison of several provisions of the two statutes will reveal the
similarities. Compare ADA § 3(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(a) (1990)) with 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)
(1988).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988).
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In recent years, the definition of handicap has gone through some expansion in
order to encompass more than disabilities such as blindness or orthopedic impair-
ment. For example, the Rehabilitation Act has recently been expanded to qualify
acquired immune deficiency syndrome, or AIDS, as a handicap protected under
this Act. In Chalk v. United States District Court Central District of California,
27
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found AIDS to be a protected
handicap28 and reinstated a California teacher who tested positive for AIDS.29 The
court ruled that AIDS fit the Act's definition of disability and that because the
teacher would still be able to perform his job in spite of the handicap, discrimina-
tion based upon AIDS would be prohibited."
In Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District,3 AIDS was again found to be
a qualified handicap under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.32 In Thomas, a
federal district court ordered a school district to readmit a child who was discov-
ered to be infected with AIDS.' In addition to classifying AIDS as a protected dis-
ability, the federal district court removed from the affected individual any burden
of showing there was no danger of spreading the virus.34
Finally, in a legal opinion dated September 27, 1988, the United States Justice
Department stated that Section 504 should be read to include the protection of
symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals." s The opinion stated
that those infected with the HIV virus were protected against "discrimination in
any covered program or activity on the basis of any actual, past or perceived effect
of HIV infection that substantially limits any major life activity" as long as the in-
fected individual poses no direct threat to the safety of others.3"
Section 503 of this Act protects only those individuals with qualified disabili-
ties who are employed by federal contractors."' Covered employers are obligated
to take affirmative action to hire and promote "qualified individuals with handi-
caps" 38 and to post notices of this obligation in conspicuous places." Contractors
with contracts of more than $50,000 are required to prepare a written affirmative
action plan delineating plans covering qualified handicapped individuals." This
27. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
28. Id. at 708.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 709. The court also found that the chance of the virus spreading based on normal or "casual" contact
caused by the teacher's activities would present "no significant risk to children . . . . "Id. at 711.
31. 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
32.Jd. at 383.
33. Id. at 382.
34. See id. at 381-82.
35. Justice Department Memorandum on the Application of Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act to HIV-
infected Individuals, Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) 403:2021 (Sept. 27, 1988).
36. Id.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1988).
38. Id.
39. See41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(0 (1989).
40.41 C.F.R. § 60-741.5 (1989).
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plan is to be revised annually4' and made available for inspection to any employee
or job applicant upon request.42
In addition, the United States Supreme Court in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Dar-
rone43 concluded that Section 504 included a private right of action for individual
victims of discrimination.44 The Supreme Court opined that the legislative history
showed that Section 504 was never intended to limit private actions against em-
ployers.4s The Court held it would be "anomalous to conclude that the section, 'de-
signed to enhance the ability of handicapped individuals to assure compliance
with [§ 504],' . . . silently adopted a drastic limitation on the handicapped indi-
vidual's right to sue federal grant recipients for employment discrimination."
46
Therefore, until the passage of the ADA, the only federal protection for dis-
abled Americans who were the victims of employment discrimination because of
their disabilities was for those working for federal contractors or in programs
which specifically received federal aid.
B. State Law
At present, a majority of states have stepped in to provide some protection for
handicapped victims of employment discrimination.47 For example, the State of
Mississippi provides protection for employees of the state or state-funded pro-
grams in a manner similar to the Federal Rehabilitation Act.' The Mississippi
statute expressly proscribes the refusal of employment by any state employer or
employer funded in whole or in part by state funds to any person "by reason of his
being blind, visually handicapped, deaf, or otherwise physically handicapped,
unless such disability shall materially affect the performance of the work required
by the job . . . . "" Mississippi also passed another statute prohibiting discrimi-
nation against any individual "seeking employment in state service" based on
"race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or handicap."5' These protections
are only available for employees of the state government or programs funded by
the state government.
Additionally, the Mississippi State Personnel Board promulgated regulations
which require each state agency to adopt an affirmative action program to increase
the number of minorities, women and handicapped employees.1 The regulations
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
44. Id. at 633.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 635 (citation omitted).
47. See Key Provisions in State Fair Employment Practice Laws, Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) 451:101-206 (Jan.
1989).
48. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988) with Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-6-15 (1972). For a further explana-
tion of the effects of the Mississippi statute see infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
49. Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-6-15 (1972).
50. Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-9-149 (Supp. 1990).
51. See Miss. State Personnel Board Manual of Policies, Rules, and Regulations, Feb. 1, 198 1; see also Miss.
State Personnel Board Policy Manual, Rule 7.30, July 1, 1989.
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are written to "assure non-discrimination personnel administration," 2 as well as
requiring all state agencies to adopt an affirmative action plan which analyzes and
increases the numbers of handicapped employees .5 Again, these regulations pro-
tect only state employees.
On the other hand, Tennessee has a much broader handicap discrimination stat-
ute. The Tennessee statute prohibits discrimination in the "hiring, firing and other
terms and conditions of employment" by the state or any private employer "based
solely upon any physical, mental or visual handicap of the applicant... ,,54 Vio-
lation of the statute is a misdemeanor.
5
5
The Tennessee handicap discrimination law also provides several avenues of
enforcement for victims. First, the law applies to all employers in the state, even
private employers.6 In addition, the statute provides for a private right of action
by individuals, in addition to the administrative remedies available. 57 Therefore, a
statute such as this provides a greater opportunity for redress to a handicapped vic-
tim of employment discrimination than prior federal legislation.
A majority of states have written or interpreted their discrimination statutes to
include protection of AIDS victims. 8 Some states even have discrimination stat-
utes dealing specifically with AIDS and AIDS testing.5 9 Generally, these statutes
prohibit employment discrimination based upon test results showing AIDS infec-
tion. 60
52. See Miss. State Personnel Board Manual of Policies, Rules, and Regulations, Feb. 1, 1981, Rule 5.10 and
5.10.1.
53. See id. at Rule 5.10.2.
54. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103(a) (Supp. 1990).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at § 8-50-103(b)(1). The statute is permissive in its provision of the administrative remedy. The stat-
ute states that any person "aggrieved by a discriminatory practice prohibited by this section may file" a complaint
with the Tennessee Human Rights Commission (THRC). Id. (emphasis added). In addition, the THRC provides
a statement which explains to every complainant that they have the right to file an action in the state chancery
court, as well as the administrative complaint. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-311 (Supp. 1990).
58. What Discrimination is Forbidden: AIDS Discrimination, Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) No. 625, at 8 (July
1989). For example, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission has promulgated a policy statement which classifies
AIDS within the definition of "handicapped" contained in the Michigan Handicappers Civil Rights Act. MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.1101-.1607 (West 1985). See Michigan: Commission Policy Statement on AIDS, Fair
Empl. Prac. (BNA) 455:1065 (Oct. 1986). At least thirty-six states have statutes dealing with or construed to
cover the issue of employees infected with AIDS.
59. State Fair Employment Practice Laws, Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) 451:1,5 (Feb. 1991). For example, Mas-
sachusetts has a statute which proscribes AIDS testing as a condition of employment, requires an individual's
informed consent before any testing occurs and mandates confidentiality for test results. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
11l, § 70F (Law. Co-op. 1991). California also has several statutory provisions dealing with AIDS testing, con-
fidentiality of test results and employment discrimination. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.95 (West
1990) (California Communicable Disease Statute which prevents employer testing unless employer can show test
is a bona fide occupational qualification).
60. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.95 (West 1990).
[Vol. 11:233
HANDICAPPED DISCRIMINA TION LA W
III. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
A. Introduction
The ADA was designed to provide comprehensive protection for disabled
Americans from bias against physical and mental disabilities.61 In addition to pro-
hibiting all employers from discrimination against employees based upon their
disabilities, the ADA also prohibits discrimination in the areas of public ser-
vices,62 public accommodations," and telecommunications." The specific focus
of this particular analysis of the ADA is a discussion of the sweeping changes cre-
ated in the area of employment law by Title I of the Act.
B. Covered Individuals
The ADA specifically provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such indi-
vidual ..."6 A "qualified individual" is "an individual with a disability who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or desires."6 Thus, in order
to be protected, an individual must be able to fulfill the essential functions of the
job, except for the disability.'
The definition of "disability" is taken almost verbatim from Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. 68 The ADA provides a three-prong definition of disability:
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C)
being regarded as having such an impairment."69
As covered in the first prong, the terms "physical and mental impairments" en-
compass more than the typical orthopedic or mental afflictions which often come
to mind. However, this should not pose a problem for lawyers or employers in their
implementation of the employment sections of the ADA. Judicial decisions, as
well as regulations promulgated by various government agencies, will provide ac-
cessible and persuasive interpretations of diseases and physical and mental condi-
61. ADA§§ 101-108 (codifiedat42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, 12111 note(1990)). Inaddition, theEEOC,
the agency responsible for enforcement of Title I, has issued its final regulations for this title. These can be lo-
cated at 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1991).
62. ADA §§ 201-246 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, 12161 note (1990)).
63. ADA §§ 301-310 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189, 12181 note (1990)). Even though this portion
of the ADA will not be discussed in depth in this article, it is important to note that the Justice Department, the
agency responsible for enforcement of Title III of the ADA, promulgated proposed regulations for this Title on
February 22, 1991, and can be found at 28 CFR Part 36 (1991).
64. ADA §§ 401-402 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 152, 221,225, 611 (1990)).
65. ADA § 102(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1990)) (emphasis added).
66. ADA § 101(8) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1990)).
67. Id. For a more complete analysis of the "essential functions" requirement, see info notes 174-79 and ac-
companying text.
68. Compare ADA § 3(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990)) with 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988).
69. ADA § 3(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990)).
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tions which have been found to be covered under the same definitions used in the
ADA.7" Those lists should be used as a guide in these determinations.
Under this first prong, not only must the individual have an impairment, but the
impairment must "substantially limit one or more of the major life activities" of
the person.71 In discussing the term "substantially limit," the EEOC regulations
provide several factors for consideration: (1) the nature and severity of the impair-
ment; (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; (3) the long term or
permanent impact of the impairment; (4) the geographical limitations placed on
the individual; (5) the types or classes of similar jobs in the same geographical
area from which the individual is disqualified; and (6) the broad range of jobs not
utilizing similar training and skills from which the individual is also disqualified.72
"Major life activities" are defined in the EEOC regulations as those basic activ-
ities that the average person in the general population can perform with little or no
difficulty "and include such activities as caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, sitting, standing, breathing and lifting."73
The determination of whether a person is "disabled" is to be undertaken on a
case-by-case analysis utilizing the above factors.7 4 For example, an individual who
walks using artificial legs and an individual who has a severe breathing disorder
would both be "disabled" because a major life activity, walking, would be substan-
tially limited due to the severe geographic, speed, agility and capability restric-
tions placed upon each. This inability will effectively exclude these people from
myriads of jobs.
The regulations also include working as a major life activity; however, the reg-
ulations also point out that impairment of this activity should only be considered
after ascertaining that the individual is not substantially limited in any other activ-
ity.75 For example, if the individual walks using artificial legs, there is no need to
consider whether the activity of "working" is impaired. The regulations further
point out that an individual is not substantially limited in working simply because
she is unable to perform a particular job or one requiring special or extraordinary
skills.76 The regulations provide the illustration of an airline pilot, stating that an
individual precluded from being a commercial airline pilot because of a minor vi-
70. Both the Senate and House Committee reports on the ADA expressly recognize that prior case law, regu-
lations and administration decisions under such laws as Section 504 and the Fair Housing Amendments Act
should be applied in defining "disability" under the ADA. S. REP. No. 101-16, 121, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 50-51 (1990). Seealso H.R. REp. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 26 (1990).
71. ADA § 3(2)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(2)(A) (1990)).
72.29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(6) (1991).
73. Id.
74. Id. This case-by-case approach has been the subject of criticism since the issuance of the proposed regula-
tions in February, 1991. The main criticism has been the lack of definiteness for businesses in making their deci-
sions. See More Lawsuits?, NAT'L L.J. Mar. 25, 1991, at 1, 28. However, the final version of the regulations
maintains this case-by-case approach. 29 C.ER. § 1630.20() (1991).
75.29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1991).
76. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) (1991).
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sion impairment would not be impaired in working if she would still qualify to fly
for a courier service.77
The second prong covers individuals with a "record of such an impairment."
7
The Senate and House Judiciary Committee reports clearly reveal the intent of this
protection.
This provision is included in the definition in part to protect individuals who have
recovered from a physical or mental impairment which previously limited them in a
major life activity. Discrimination on the basis of such a past impairment would be
prohibited under this legislation. Frequently occurring examples of the first group
(i.e., those who have a history of an impairment) are people with histories of mental
or emotional illness, heart disease, or cancer; examples of the second group (i.e.,
those who have been misclassified as having an impairment) are people who have
been misclassified as mentally retarded.7
Finally, the third prong is designed to protect those individuals who are dis-
criminated against as though being disabled, regardless of whether they actually
are." The ADA utilizes the same test presented in the regulations of Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act.
"Is regarded as having an impairment" means (A) has a physical or mental impair-
ment that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated . . . as
constituting such a limitation; (B) has a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such
impairment; or (C) has none of the impairments defined [in the actual impairment
paragraph] but is treated . . .as having such an impairment.8"
Because the statute was designed to draw on the body of case law construing
Section 504,82 numerous amendments were proffered which sought to overturn or
include various judicial interpretations of the term "disability." The most contro-
versial of these amendments were designed to exclude acquired immune defi-
ciency syndrome, or AIDS, from the definition of "disabled." As noted
previously, the courts had interpreted Section 504 to include the disease as a dis-
ability.
8 3
Initially, supporters of this viewpoint attempted to amend the definition to spe-
cifically exclude these conditions. For example, while the bill was pending before
the House of Representatives' Energy and Commerce Committee, Representative
William Dannemeyer (R-Cal.) presented an amendment to specifically exclude
from coverage carriers of the HIV virus who were homosexuals or users of illegal
77. Id.
78. ADA § 3(2)(B) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(2)(B) (1990)).
79. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 52-
53(1990).
80. ADA § 3(2)(C) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(2)(C) (1990)).
81.45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (1990). See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 29 (1990); S.
REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., at 123 (1990).
82. See supm note 25 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
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drugs-causes most often linked to transmission of the virus.8 4 Representative
Dannemeyer argued that there is a "fundamental distinction" between homosexual
HIV carriers, or carriers infected through the ingestion of illegal substances, and
truly disabled individuals because those types of carriers were infected with a dis-
ease as a result of "conscious life choices and the behavior they pursue."85
However, his bill was defeated due to several factors.8" Initially, it seems that
many are in favor of including AIDS victims within the parameters of the ADA.87
This is evidenced by the Committee's resounding defeat of the proposed amend-
ment. 88 Finally, as discussed previously, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the
model for the ADA, covers carriers of the AIDS and HIV viruses.89
Amendments concerning AIDS appeared again in another form. Representa-
tive Jim Chapman (D-Tex.) proposed an amendment allowing restaurant employ-
ers to transfer employees infected with the AIDS or HIV virus from food-handling
positions, if the transfer resulted in no loss of pay or benefits to the employees.9 "
Proponents of the amendment argued that citizens would refuse to patronize any
food establishment if it became public knowledge that such an employee carried
one of these viruses.91 Opponents claimed the measure was a legislative panacea
for fear and prejudice.92 The measure was passed by the House of Representa-
tives."
However, the Senate version of the bill had no such provision. During the Con-
ference Committee's attempts to assimilate the House and Senate versions of the
ADA, the provision was substantially changed to delete AIDS and HIV carriers
from this provision.94 Thus, employers are allowed to transfer food handlers with
communicable diseases, however, AIDS and the HIV virus are not considered
communicable diseases under the ADA.
The ADA does specifically state that certain conditions are not covered as "dis-
abilities." Transvestism,9" homosexuality,97 and bisexuality98 are specifically ex-
cluded from coverage under the ADA. Users of "illegal drugs" are also excluded.9
Although case law under Section 504 had required a showing that the drug use af-
84. Bush Seeking Modifications in Disability-Rights Bill, 48 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Mar. 17, 1990, at 837
[hereinafter Modifications].





90. 136 CONG. REc. 2471-01 (1990) (introduced on the floor of the House on May 17, 1990).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. The measure passed by a vote of 199-187.
94. See ADA § 103(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d) (1990)).
95. Id.
96. ADA § 51 1(b)(I) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1221 1(b)(1) (1990)).
97. ADA § 51 1(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1221 1(a) (1990)).
98. Id.
99. ADA § 510 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12110 (1990)).
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fected work performance or safety,1"' the ADA contains no such standard and
these individuals will not be protected by the ADA. 101
However, the ADA's exclusion of drug users is not without limit. The Act states
that individuals who meet the following conditions are excluded from the defini-
tion of "drug user":
(1) Anyone who has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program and is no
longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated from
such use;
(2) Anyone who is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no
longer engaging in such use; or
(3) Anyone who is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging
in such use.
102
Also, the ADA does not prohibit the use of drug tests0 ' and they have been ex-
pressly excluded from the types of medical tests proscribed by the Act. 04 Another
strong measure contained in the law allows employers to hold drug users, as well
as alcoholics, to the "same qualification standards for employment or job perform-
ance and behavior" as other employees, even if unsatisfactory performance is re-
lated to drug or alcohol use."5 Basically, these sections allow an employer to take
action against an employee if the employee is currently using drugs or alcohol, the
use of the substance affects predetermined performance or behavior standards,
and if the employer is basing the action on the illegal use itself.
C. Prohibited Activities
As noted previously, Section 102(a) states "[n]o covered entity shall discrimi-
nate against a qualified individual with a disability .... "106 Section 102(b) de-
fines the types of employer activities which are deemed to be discriminatory
actions.107 This subsection contains several provisions which preclude actions the
public would more readily consider "discrimination." For example, Section
102(b)(1) prohibits the use of a disability in "limiting, segregating, or classifying"
an individual in a manner that "adversarily affects" that individual's employment
opportunities. 08 Section 102(b)(2) proscribes participating in a "contractual or
other arrangement or relationship" which would discriminate against covered indi-
100. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988). See also Heron v. McGuire, 803 F2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1986).
101. ADA § 510 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12210 (1990)).
102. ADA § 104(b)(l)-(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)(1)-(3) (1990)).
103. ADA § 104(b)-(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)-(d) (1990)).
104. ADA § 104(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12114(d) (1990)).
105. ADA § 104(c)(4) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (1990)).
106. ADA § 102(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1990)).
107. ADA § 102(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (1990)).
108. ADA § 102(b)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (1990)).
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viduals. "9 This section is specifically designed to include such employment activ-
ities as pension plans, labor unions, training programs, etc. 1
10
Section 102(b)(5) presents the most far-reaching of all the provisions. Section
102(b)(5)(a) states that discrimination can be defined as:
Not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or em-
ployee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.111
Indeed, this provision constitutes a large portion of the ADA's prohibitions. In-
stead of liability based on the commission of some act, this provision says it is an
act of discrimination for any employer to fail to make efforts ensuring that any and
all obstacles have been removed from handicapped job applicants and employ-
ees. 112 These efforts are called "reasonable accommodations;" however, the ADA
does not specifically define "reasonable accommodations." The ADA's mandate
requiring employers to accommodate disabled persons is not without limit. Rea-
sonable accommodation is required "unless [the] covered entity can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of such covered entity."" 3 Like reasonable accommodation, the term
"undue hardship" is undefined in the ADA. '14
As a result of this lack of definition, much of the debate over the ADA sur-
rounded the obligation of employers to reasonably accommodate disabled individ-
uals.115 Those concerned with the effects of such all encompassing legislation
pointed to this type of provision as an abyss over which employers would be forced
to traverse without any guidance.
Proponents of the Act attempted to allay these fears by pointing out that most
accommodations were actually inexpensive. In September 1989, Evan Kemp,
then Equal Employment Opportunity Commissioner and also a handicapped indi-
vidual, told a group of retailers that most methods of accommodation only re-
quired such activities as adjusting an individual's work schedule or raising and
lowering the heights of desks. 6 In fact, Kemp claimed that Sears Roebuck & Co.
109. ADA § 102(b)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (1990)).
110. Id.
11l. ADA § 102(b)(5)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1990)) (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. There is a line of cases which construes "undue hardship" in terms of making reasonable accommodations
to avoid claims of religious discrimination. However, the Housing Judiciary Committee report explains that the
ADA duty to provide reasonable accommodation was designed to be distinguished from the U.S. Supreme
Court's interpretation of Title VII in T.W.A. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). In that case, the Supreme Court
held that accommodations to religious beliefs need not be provided if the cost was more than de minimis to the
employer. Id. at 68.
115. See, e.g., Small Business and Local Government Group Question Costs of Federal Bill for Disabled, 209
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-I (Oct. 31, 1989).
116. EEOC Commissioner Kemp Urges Retailers to View Disabled Workers as New Labor Source, 178 Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) A-I l (Sept. 15, 1989).
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had entirely retrofitted its famed Chicago headquarters building to accommodate
disabled people for the mere cost of $7,000.117
The EEOC regulations describe an accommodation as any change in the work
environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an individual
with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunity." 8 The regulations ex-
plain the obligations of reasonable accommodation in this way:
The reasonable accommodation requirement is best understood as a means by which
barriers to the equal employment opportunity of an individual with a disability are
removed or alleviated. These barriers may, for example, be physical or structural ob-
stacles that inhibit or prevent the access of an individual with a disability to job sites,
facilities or equipment. Or they may be rigid work schedules that permit no flexibil-
ity as to when work is performed or when breaks may be taken, or inflexible job pro-
cedures that unduly limit the modes of communication that are used on the job, or
the way in which particular tasks are accomplished." 9
In addition to defining reasonable accommodation, the regulations provide nu-
merous examples of how to decide on an accommodation. 20 Another aid for em-
ployers in deciding how to accommodate a disabled individual is prior case law
interpreting Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Because of the language's con-
nection with Section 504, there is a myriad of case law construing the term "rea-
sonable accommodation" upon which employers can rely for guidance.
121
As part of its effort to protect those with disabilities, Congress, through Section
102 of the ADA, prohibited certain use of medical examinations .122 The section
states that "a covered entity shall not conduct a medical examination or make in-
quiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a dis-
ability or as to the nature or severity of such disability."' 23 This section does permit
pre-employment inquiries into whether an applicant can perform "job-related"
functions. 1
24
These inquiries are, however, quite limited. For example, the regulations make
it clear that there can be no inquiry as to whether an applicant has ever filed a
workers' compensation claim. 25 Nor can an employer inquire into an applicant's
medical history. 126 Instead, the employer may only ask, in positive terms, whether
an applicarit can perform the essential functions of the position.127 If the disabled
117. Id.
118.29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0) (1991).
119. 29 C.ER. § 1630.9 (1991).
120. For specific examples, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0) (1991) and § 1630.9 (1991).
121. See supm note 24 and accompanying text.
122. ADA § 102(c) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c) (1990)).
123. ADA § 102(c)(2)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(A) (1990)).
124. ADA § 102(c)(2)(B) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(B) (1990)).
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individual is medically unable to perform the essential job functions, the employer
will be allowed to deny employment to the individual.
On the other hand, the ADA does allow for "employment entrance examina-
tions" provided certain conditions are met. 128 According to this provision, an em-
ployer can require a pre-employment medical examination after an offer of
employment to the applicant, but prior to the applicant's start in the position.129
The employer may also condition the employment on the results of the exam, if (a)
"all entering employees are subjected to" the exam; (b) the results, including medi-
cal history, are collected and maintained in separate, confidential files; and (c) the
results are not used to discriminate on the basis of any disability as proscribed in
the Act. '30 The regulations state that these types of exams need not be job related;
however, if the employer screens out employees based on disabilities, then the em-
ployer will have to prove the exclusionary criteria are job-related, consistent with
business necessity, and performance of essential job functions require reasonable
accomodation. "' Such a showing will constitute a valid defense.132
In addition, the prohibition against medical examinations does not preclude
voluntary examinations, including medical history, as part of an employee health
program.' 33 The regulations further indicate that employers will be permitted to
establish, sponsor, observe or administer benefit plans, such as health and life in-
surance plans. '34 Also, the regulations state a plan will not be found in violation of
the ADA if it results in limitations on disabled individuals, as long as the plan is
not "used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the] regulations.""' Even with
this caveat, employers should be aware of this issue in the future as it may be an
area which is often litigated.
D. Implementation
A large portion of the debate over the ADA concerned its implementation.
Again, the concerns of businesses over the costs involved in accommodating
handicapped persons was at the crux of the debate. For example, Carolyn Weaver,
a resident scholar with a conservative think tank named the American Enterprise
Institute, told a group of Republican Representatives that many costs would arise
due to the passage of the ADA.136
128. ADA § 102(c)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(3) (1990)).
129. Id.
130. Id. The ADA denotes three exceptions to the confidential requirements: (1) supervisors "may be in-
formed regarding necessary restrictions on work duties; (2) first aid and safety personnel may be informed, when
appropriate if the disability might require emergency treatment; and (3) government officials investigating com-
pliance with" the provisions of the Act. Id. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 (1991).
131.29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 (1991).
132. Id.
133. ADA § 102(c)(4)(B) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(4)(B) (1990)).
134. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(f) (1991). This exemption is not intended to include liability insurance coverage.
135. Id.
136. House Republican Group Holds Discussion on Effect ofADA on U.S. Competitiveness, 27 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) A-I (Feb. 8, 1990) [hereinafter Competitiveness].
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As a result of voluminous testimony like that of Ms. Weaver, a myriad of sug-
gestions were proffered for amending the ADA. Ms. Weaver advocated a tax
credit for employers who were forced to expend funds for physical alterations. 
1 37
Ronald Lindsay, a prominent Washington, D.C., lawyer, proposed a statutory ceil-
ing on monetary expenditures to a House Task Force on American Competitive-
ness. 138 Mr. Lindsay's proposal would place a statutory cap on expenditures which
the ADA could force an employer to spend on accommodations.139 For example,
the ADA could place a cap of five percent of the gross salary on the employment
position in question.140
In an effort to address these cost concerns, several attempts were made to
amend the bill. One such amendment was introduced in November, 1989, by Sen-
ator Herbert Kohl (D-Wis.) and Representative Jim Moody (D-Wis.)."1 Under
this bill, businesses would have received a refundable eighty percent (80%) tax
credit for covered expenditures between $250 and $4,000. 142 In addition, eligible
businesses would also have been able to carry over to the following year expendi-
tures above this $4,000 ceiling. 11 This bill was defeated. 1"
Another effort was introduced in late September, 1989, by Senator David Pryor
(D-Ark.). 1" Pryor's proposal would have replaced the present $35,000 tax deduc-
tion allowed under Section 190 of the Internal Revenue Code with a $5,000 re-
fundable tax credit."14 However, this measure was also defeated.147
The compromise which finally passed in the final version of the ADA was to
allow smaller businesses a longer period of time before the provisions take effect.
By its terms, the employment section of the ADA becomes effective twenty-four
months after the date of enactment. 1" This effective date will apply for all employ-
ers with twenty-five or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more weeks." However, employers with between fifteen and twenty-five em-
ployees are given an extra two years within which to meet the provisions of the
employment title of the ADA. 0 This delay of the effective date for small to me-




141. Senator Kohl, Representative Moody Propose Tax Credit for Firms Making Adjustments for Disabled, 220




145. Tax Credit Proposed as Incentive for Small Firms to Comply with Disability Act, 196 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) A-16 (Oct. 12, 1989).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. ADA § 108 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111 note (1990)). The effective date of enactment was July 26,
1990.
149. ADA § 101(5)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1990)).
150. Id.
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dium-sized employers will help to lessen the burden in accommodating disabled
workers.
Furthermore, as part of the implementation process, the ADA mandates that
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission promulgate regulations within
one year of the enactment date. 5
E. Remedies
When a person feels he or she has been aggrieved under the ADA, they must
follow the same procedures utilized under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.152 The ADA specifically incorporates by reference the relevant sections of
the Civil Rights Act 15 3 and states that those sections provide the "powers, reme-
dies, and procedures" for bringing a claim under the ADA. 14
One main reason for this duplication of remedies and procedures is that the
ADA was designed to put disabled individuals on the same level as other groups
which are commonly discriminated against.155 Thus, the ADA specifically pro-
vides for the same remedies provided for by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 156 These
include injunctive relief, back pay and attorney's fees.,
5 7
Following the introduction of a bill entitled the Civil Rights Act of 1990, the
ADA remedy provision generated much debate.5 8 The main thrust of this bill was
to amend the remedies provisions of Title VII to allow compensatory and punitive
damages in instances of intentional discrimination. In October, 1989, the Bush ad-
ministration reached a compromise with the Senate in their version of the
ADA. 15 9 This provision was to limit the remedies available under the ADA to only
those available under the 1964 version of the Civil Rights Act." 0
On the other hand, no such compromise was reached with the House of Repre-
sentatives. 161 As stated by Representative Steny Hoyer (D-Md.), one of the major
proponents of the ADA, "[t]he point of the disability community is that they
wanted to be treated the same as other minorities.1 62
With the full support of the White House, Representative F. James Sensenbren-
ner (R-Wis.) offered an amendment limiting the remedies provision to the reme-
151. ADA § 106 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1990)). The EEOC issued proposed regulations for com-
ment in February, 1991. As noted supra, the final regulations were issued on July 26, 1991.
152. ADA § 107(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1990)).
153.42 U.S.C. § 2000(c)(4)-(e)(9) (1988).
154. ADA § 107(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1990)).
155. See Royner, Disability-Rights Legislation Headed for Conference, 48 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., May 26,
1990, at 1657, 1659 [hereinafter Headed for Conference]; see also Royner, Bush Seeking Modifications in Disabil-
ity-Rights Bill, 48 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Mar. 17, 1990, at 837, 838.
156. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(4)-(e)(9) (1988).
158. Headed for Conference, supra note 155, at 1659. The bill was numbered H.R. 4000 in the House of Repre-
sentatives and S. 2104 in the Senate. Id.
159. Headed for Conference, supra note 155, at 1659.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Royner, Bush Seeking Modification In Disability Rights Bill, supra note 155, at 837.
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dies available under the 1964 Act.1"3 Despite this support, the proposal was
defeated. 
164
The ADA eventually passed with no limiting provision. 165 The Civil Rights Act
of 1990 was eventually passed, however, Congress was unable to override a presi-
dential veto. 166 This bill has been proposed again as the Civil Rights Act of 1991
and at the time of this writing is under debate. 16 7 Therefore, if the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 is successful in amending the Title VII damages provisions to provide for
these additional remedies, these remedies will also be available to aggrieved par-
ties under the ADA.
168
E Employer Defenses
There are several important actions and defenses available to employers under
the ADA. First, as noted previously, 169 the ADA requires reasonable accommo-
dation for disabled individuals unless such accommodation would constitute "un-
due hardship." 7 The ADA defines "undue hardship" as "an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors" enumer-
ated in the ADA. 171 These factors include: (1) the cost and nature of the accommo-
dation; (2) financial resources of the facility, number of employees employed
there, impact of the accommodation on the facility; (3) overall size and financial
resources of the covered entity; and (4) the overall composition and structure of
the work force.172 Thus, if an employer can utilize these factors to show that ac-
commodating an individual would pose an undue hardship on his business, this
will present a successful defense on his behalf. For example, an employer faced
with adjusting work schedules can claim undue hardship if he can show the cost
would be significant compared to his revenues and would adversely affect opera-
tions of a plant with a small work force. This is the type of case-by-case analysis
which employers will be forced to utilize in evaluating "reasonable accommoda-
tions."
However, the EEOC regulations point out that in considering whether an ac-
commodation constitutes an undue hardship, more than just financial consider-
ations should come into play.173 For example, the regulations present a situation
where an individual with a visual handicap applies for a position as a waiter in a
night club.174 The regulations then explain undue hardship in this manner:
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. See ADA § 107 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1990)).
166. 136 CONG. REc. § 16589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
167. The bill was reintroduced in the House of Representatives as H.R. 1.
168. See ADA § 107(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1990)).
169. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
170. ADA § 102(b)(5)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1990)).
171. ADA § 101(10)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(A) (1990)).
172. ADA § 101(10)(B) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (10)(B) (1990)).
173. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (1991).
174. Id.
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Although the individual may be able to perform the job in bright lighting, the night
club will probably be able to demonstrate that that particular accommodation,
though inexpensive, would impose an undue hardship if the bright lighting would
destroy the ambiance of the night club and/or make it difficult for the customers to
see the stage show.17
Thus, it is important for an employer to recognize all the factors surrounding his
decision over whether an accommodation would constitute an undue hardship.
Furthermore, an employer must realize that even though one type of accommoda-
tion would be precluded, the obligation for reasonable accommodation is not alle-
viated.17 If another alternative exists which is not an undue hardship, the
employer must utilize that method.177
In addition, if an employer can show under the previously enumerated factors
that an accommodation would impose financial hardship, the employer's analysis
still may not be finished. If funding is available from another source (i.e., state
agencies) and that funding would remove the hardship, then the employer is obli-
gated to pursue the proposed accommodation.17 For example, if an applicant is
bound to a wheelchair and the accommodation sought could be made except for
the fact that the necessary renovations are too costly for the employer, the em-
ployer may be eligible to receive funds from a state vocational rehabilitation
agency or may utilize any applicable tax deductions.179 If these circumstances al-
leviate the hardship, then the employer could be required to make this accommo-
dation because it had become a reasonable one.18 Therefore, employers should
make themselves aware of these types of programs which aid employers in accom-
modating handicapped workers.
Another defense which may be available to an employer is contained in Section
103 of the ADA. That section provides:
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this Act that an alleged appli-
cation of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out or other-
wise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to be
job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be
accompanied by reasonable accommodating as required under this title. 181
Under this defense an employer may set performance or behavioral standards to
use as selection criteria for a position. These criteria are called "qualification
standards" under the ADA.182 It is still unclear at this time as to the full range of











cluded in this section.183 For example, if a potential employee cannot meet a cer-
tain piece rate standard, even after reasonable accommodation, then obviously
that individual would fail to meet the qualification standards.
Also included as a "qualification standard" is a requirement that the handi-
capped applicant not pose a "direct threat" to other employees in the workplace. 18
Section 103(b) explicitly states that a qualification standard may mean that "an in-
dividual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in
the workplace." 8 ' According to the EEOC regulations, if an applicant poses a di-
rect threat because of a disability, the employer should consider whether a reason-
able accommodation would remove the threat. If not, the employer may refuse to
hire the individual. 
186
In determining whether a threat exists, the employer must first identify the spe-
cific risk involved.' 87 After the risk is identified, the EEOC regulations suggest
the application of the following factors: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature
and severity of the harm; and (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will oc-
cur.188 These factors must be evaluated by relying on objective facts and medical
data. If indeed, factual and medical data reveal a distinct and significant threat of a
specific risk, then the employer may refuse to hire the individual.189 Employers
should be aware that any review of this decision during a subsequent lawsuit will
be fact intensive.190 Given this awareness, employers should take special care to
document the facts and data upon which they base such decisions.
Finally, an employer may base employment decisions on pre-determined job
descriptions written before the hiring process begins. As noted previously,' 9' the
ADA protects qualified individuals who can perform the "essential functions" of
the job.'92 Although the term "essential functions" is not defined by the ADA, the
Act states that:
[C]onsiderations shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a
job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before adver-
tising or interviewing applications for the job, this description shall be considered
evidence of the essential functions of the job.
193
This section will give deference to the employer in defining the essential func-
tions of a position, provided the employer defines the functions beforehand to in-
183. Id.
184. ADA § 103(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1990)).
185. Id.
186. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1991). It is important to note that the risk must be significant. An employer may





191. Id. See, e.g., Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985); Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716
F2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
192. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
193. ADA § 101(8) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1990)).
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sure the description is not simply a tool for discrimination. The EEOC regulations
also recognize that job descriptions contained in collective bargaining agreements
are evidence of the essential functions of a position.194 Therefore, this is an impor-
tant tool which employers should utilize as a part of the hiring process.
The existence of a written job description does not end the analysis, since it will
only be a factor considered in whether the individual can perform the essential
functions of the job.195 The EEOC regulations enumerate several additional fac-
tors to be considered in determining "essential function":
(1) Whether the reason the position exists is to perform that function;
(2) The number of other employees available to perform that task, or among
whom the task can be distributed; and
(3) The degree of expertise or skill required to perform the function. 
196
After enumerating these factors, the regulations point out that the issue of
whether a particular function is essential is a factual determination that will be
made on a case-by-case basis.' 97 In discussing relevant evidence that should be
considered, an established job description is an important element. In addition to
job descriptions, relevant evidence includes: (1) the employer's judgment as to
which functions are essential; (2) the amount of time spent on the job performing
the function; (3) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the
function; (4) the work experience of past incumbents in the job; and (5) the current
work experience of incumbents in similiar jobs.9 8
Given that the employer is aware of the factors used to determine this issue, he
or she will be better able to define the job description to protect their decisions.
The EEOC regulations claim that "the inquiry into essential functions is not in-
tended to second guess an employer's business judgment with regard to production
standards, whether qualitative or quantitative, nor to require employers to lower
such standards." 9 Therefore, as long as the employer has a legitimate business
rationale for the description, it should be given deference by the courts. In this
way, employers can better protect themselves, as well as hire employees who can
perform the tasks they are hired to perform.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ADA ushers in a new era for employers and attorneys. For the first time,
any employer may be held liable if it fails to take action to accommodate. The ulti-
mate impact of this new approach to remedying discrimination could be far reach-
ing, particularly in light of the strong desire of Congress to amend current civil
rights statutes.
194. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15 (1991).
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Although the legislative history and EEOC regulations attempt to give employ-
ers some solace as to second guessing employers' ability to describe essential job
functions, and offers some defenses to the requirements of reasonable accommo-
dation, an employer faced with defending his decison will need to be armed with
financial data as to cost and ability to pay, as well as economic studies as to the
design of the workplace. While there is little doubt that the disabled should be pro-
tected from discrimination, and thus be afforded the full opportunity to participate
in our economic system, the far reaching language of the ADA may lead to delays
in meeeting the expectations raised by the Act while the courts become more and
more embroiled in analyzing the details of employers' day to day operations.

